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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKETTA ALLEN, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ; 
vs. ] 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND ] 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ] 
a corporation, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
i Case No. 890408 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE/RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court by this Court's Order 
of October 27, 1989 and by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1989 cumulative supplement). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Are there adequate grounds to support the trial 
court's ruling, based on the memoranda filed and prior case law 
as follows: 
(a) Under Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, are the facts set forth in defendant's (movant's) 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
sufficient to support the trial court's ruling? 
(b) Is the trial court's ruling in the face of an 
allegedly incomplete record presumptively supported by competent 
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evidence? 
2. Is a household exclusion within a homeowner's policy 
not contrary to public policy? 
3. Has Plaintiff failed to present evidence that the 
insurance contract in question is an adhesion contract and, 
therefore, has failed to meet her burden of proof in overturning 
the same? 
4. Is Plaintiff barred from claiming ambiguity in the 
insurance contract when she did not raise that issue below in any 
argument or by the pleadings? 
5. Assuming arguendo Plaintiff is entitled to raise the 
ambiguity issue, is the insurance contract ambiguous? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
provides: 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points 
and authorities in support of a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the 
record upon which the movant relies• 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment shall begin with a section 
that contains a concise statement of material facts 
as to which the parties contend a genuine issue 
exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
ref€*r to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, 
2 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of 
the movant's facts that are disputed• All 
materials facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an adequate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff has alleged that she purchased a homeowner's 
policy, through her husband, from Defendant on June 1, 1982. (R. 
3). The policy contained an endorsement excluding liability 
coverage for household members. (R. 3-4, and 7-20). Two years 
later, on April 18, 1984, an accident occurred in which Plaintiff 
injured her son. (R. 4-5). On March 25, 1988, Plaintiff's 
husband sued her for the son's injury (R. 5, 21-22), and 
plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action claiming the 
insurance contract was a contract of adhesion (R. at 3) and the 
household exclusion was contrary to public policy (R. at 4) 
because it failed to honor the Plaintiff's reasonable 
expectations regarding policy coverage. 
On May 22, 1989, Defendant filed a Motion to Publish the 
Depositions of Plaintiff and her husband, Roscoe Ashley Allen, 
(R. at 62) and a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 5, 1989 (R. 
at 64), along with a supporting Memorandum. (R. 66-73), which 
contained uncontroverted facts. (R. 66-69). Plaintiff filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition (R. 76-82), which contained "additional 
relevant facts" and did not controvert Defendant's statement of 
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the facts. (R. 76-77). Both parties quoted from the depositions 
which were filed with the court. Plaintiff requested oral 
argument (R. 92) and the trial court granted oral argument. (R. 
94). The depositions in question were filed with the clerk prior 
to the hearing. The court heard argument on the motion for 
summary judgment on August 4, 1989 and granted Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 98-99). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly relied on the facts in the 
Memoranda submitted by the parties. Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, provides that all material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an 
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purposes of summary judgment, unless the opposing party 
specifically controverts those facts. In this case, those facts 
were not controverted. Basically, the parties stipulated to the 
facts. Moreover, any missing portions of the record are presumed 
to support the trial judge's decision. 
The Plaintiff has presented no evidence and no case law 
supporting her claims that the policy endorsement excluding 
liability coverage for household members in a homeowner's policy 
is contrary to public policy. In fact, the majority of courts 
which have considered the issue have upheld such policy language. 
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the contract is 
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an adhesion contract, nor that it is void as a result. Plaintiff 
never read the policy (R. at 68; Deposition of R. Allen at 29-33; 
Deposition of Plaintiff at 10). She never shopped for different 
policies (Id.; Deposition of Plaintiff at 6-7, 12-13, 24, 56 and 
60-62), and she never bothered to read it upon receipt. (R. at 
68-69; Deposition of R. Allen at 29-33; Deposition of Plaintiff 
at 10, 13 and 20). She had never read the policy even after the 
filing of this lawsuit and at the time of her deposition. (R. 69; 
Deposition of Plaintiff at 35-36, 46-47). 
Plaintiff never claimed ambiguity in the policy language 
in her Complaint, Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment or at any other time. She is barred from 
raising it now. Even assuming arguendo that she is allowed to 
raise that issue, the endorsement is clear and unambiguous. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE IS AN ADEQUATE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING; MOREOVER, AN INADEQUATE RECORD 
PRESUMPTIVELY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING. 
A. Facts Set Forth In Support Of A Motion For Summary Judgment, 
And Which Are Not Controverted, Are Deemed Admitted. 
Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
clearly provides that facts in a movant's brief which are not 
controverted by the opposing memorandum are admitted. A review 
of the briefs filed by the parties shows that Plaintiff did not 
controvert the facts listed by Defendant. Both parties relied on 
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these facts and the court, under the local rules, had before it 
courtesy copies of the briefs and parts of the depositions. 
Since both parties relied on the same parts of the depositions 
and since those parts were not controverted, those facts set 
forth in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment are admitted. In effect, the parties stipulated 
to the facts and the court applied the law. Therefore, the court 
had an adequate factual basis to make its decision. 
B. Even If The Record Is Inadequate, The Missing Portions Are 
Presumed To Support The Trial Court's Ruling. 
In Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987), the 
district court granted a motion to enforce a settlement agreement 
and to set aside a default judgment. A dispute arose whether 
certain parties had fulfilled a condition precedent to trigger 
the enforcement of the settlement agreement. No transcript of 
the hearing was available to the Utah Supreme Court upon appeal 
of the trial court's rulings. The Supreme Court held: 
We have previously indicated that when crucial 
matters are not in the record, the missing portions 
are presumed to support the trial judge. 
Id. at 943. (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the missing transcripts, if indeed 
they are considered as missing, are presumed to support the trial 
judge's ruling. Therefore, the record is adequate. 
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Point II 
THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION IS NOT VOID AS CONTRARY TO 
PUBLIC POLICY. 
The endorsement in question, found at the record at page 
14, provides: 
Under Coverage-Personal liability, this policy 
does not apply to bodily injury to any Insured 
under parts (1) and (2) of the definition of 
"Insured". 
Section (1) is found within the record from pages 16 through 18, 
which describes the property and interests covered, and Section 
(2) is found at the record at pages 18-20, which concerns 
personal liability coverage and which is the subject of the 
lawsuit in question. 
Plaintiff has relied on cases pertaining to no-fault 
automobile insurance policies, which are inapplicable. In each 
of the cases cited by Plaintiff, Mutual of Enunclaw Ins. Co. v. 
Wiscomb, 97 Wa.2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982); Estep v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 882 (N.M. 1985); and Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Rovle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mt. 1983), the state supreme 
courts found that where the legislature had mandated automobile 
insurance to protect the public against negligent drivers, that 
the household exclusion was void as a matter of public policy 
since the legislatures had not carved out such an exception by 
legislation. Even this court has upheld a household exclusion in 
an automobile policy as to coverage in excess of the minimum 
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statutory limit. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 
748 P.2d 10i42 (Ut. 1987). The household exclusion is not viewed 
as contrary to public policy. 
Former Utah Code Annotated § 31-19-36(1) (1953), which was 
in effect at the time the policy was issued, renewed and the 
injury to Plaintiff's son, provided that each policy was to be 
construed according to the entirety of its terms, including any 
riders, endorsements or applications made a part of it. 
Homeowner's policies are not automobile policies. The latter are 
mandatory and heavily regulated by the legislature. Homeowner's 
are not obligated by statute to secure or maintain homeowner's 
insurance. There is no statute prohibiting the endorsement in 
question. Defendant may limit its obligations to provide 
coverage by clear and unmistakable language. Wagner v. Farmer's 
Ins. Exchange. 125 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 62, 63 (Court of Appeals, January 
9, 1990), P.2d . Therefore, the policy terms are 
interpreted according to their plain meaning. Id. Courts which 
have analy2:ed similar homeowner's endorsements have upheld them 
in the fac€* of public policy attacks. 
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Clendening, 150 
Cal.App.3d 40, 197 Cal.Rpt. 377 (1984), the court considered the 
same langueige. The court found the fact that the legislature had 
not entered the area evidenced a legislative intent to allow such 
exclusions. The California courts have consistently followed 
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this reasoning. In Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 244 
Cal.Rpt. 567 (Cal.App.6D 1988), the court recognized that a 
similar exclusion was common and enjoyed judicial support to 
prevent intrafamily legal actions when such actions may not be 
adversary and in which the insurer has little or no control. The 
court also recognized that to read out such exclusions would be 
unprecedented judicial interference into private contracts and 
economic arrangements. Id. at 573. In State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal.App.3d 33, 169 Cal.Rpt. 593 (1980), the 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the insurer under a 
homeowner's policy with exactly the same exclusionary language as 
before this Court. The court rejected the attack taken by the 
insured that the exclusion violated public policy. Id. at 596. 
The California analysis is not unique. Other 
jurisdictions have reached the same conclusions. In Suba v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 129 Misc.2d 839, 494 N.Y.Sp.2d 620 
(1985), the supreme court of Oneida County upheld the family 
exclusion in a homeowner's policy with regard to a ski accident 
suffered by the insured's daughter. The court reached its 
conclusion on the grounds that homeowner's insurance is entirely 
voluntary and no statutory requirements reflected public policy 
regarding its provisions. 494 N.Y.Sp.2d at 621. This court also 
recognized that imposing a public policy limitation would be an 
unauthorized judicial intrusion into the rights of the parties of 
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an insurance contract and to the determination of the obligations 
regarding premiums paid. Jd. Absent legislation, the court felt 
the parties could insert whatever conditions and agreements they 
chose. Id. at 627. The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a 
similar result in Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390 
N.W.2d 16 (Mn. 1986), holding the family exclusion was clear and 
written in simple language and there was no room for construing 
the policy under the reasonable expectations of the insured 
doctrine. The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sciaudone v. Steuk, 
512 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 1986), found the family exclusion enforceable 
because it was not contrary to public policy. In State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co. v. Holeczv, 152 Ill.App.3d 448, 504 N.E.2d 971 
(Ist.Dis. 1987), the court refused to extend coverage for a 
contribution action under a similarly-worded homeowner's 
exclusion even in the face of no-fault automobile cases and 
legislation which had declared such exclusions as void in the 
face of public policy. In Marchese v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co.. 396 So.2d 490 (La. 1981), the Louisiana court upheld summary 
judgment for the insurer for the same exclusion as found in the 
Prudential policy, finding that it was not against public policy. 
Even the Washington Supreme Court has rejected the public 
policy attcick in a homeowner's policy when it has upheld the same 
attack in an automobile insurance policy, as cited by Plaintiff 
in her briesf in the case of Mutual of Enumclaw, supra. In State 
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Farm General Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wa.2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139 
(1984), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment 
for the insurer in considering the same exclusionary language 
found in the case before this Court. The court held that 
automobile cases were not applicable because of legislation in 
the area. The court recognized the burden of proof was on the 
insured to show the exclusion was injurious to public health, 
public morals, or public confidence in the purity of the 
administration of law or that it undermined a sense of individual 
rights. 
Point III 
IN THE COURT BELOW
 f PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY 
EVIDENCE THE POLICY WAS AN ADHESION CONTRACT AND 
DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF TO RESIST THE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendant moved for summary judgment and set forth facts 
in its supporting Memorandum. Plaintiff did not controvert those 
facts, but added several more facts. Once a motion for summary 
judgment is made, the adverse party cannot rest upon mere 
allegations or denials, but "must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Brigham Truck 
& Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Ut. 1987). Utah Rule 
56(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is identical in wording to 
Federal Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
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party opposing a motion for summary judgment must come forward 
with "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986), the 
U.S. Supreme Court further held that the trial judge must view 
evidence through the prism of the substitive evidentiary burden. 
In the case before this Court plaintiff produced no evidence that 
she had no alternative in securing a policy with coverage. 
Basically, her claim is based on the "the fervent hope usually 
engendered by loss," Wagner v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, supra at 
64. 
Plaintiff did not read the policy (R. at 5; Deposition of 
Plaintiff ctt 21-22) before the accident or even after she 
commenced her lawsuit. (R. 66-69). She never negotiated for her 
her policy. (Id.) She never compared other policies. (Id.) She 
produced no evidence raising the issue that the contract is an 
adhesion contract and she could not secure a different policy. 
She was under no obligation by law to secure a homeowner's 
policy. As recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in its 
analysis in Emerson, supra, it was her burden to come forward and 
show deficiency of the exclusion and that the contract in 
question wcis adhesive and which should be declared void. The 
record is devoid of any such evidence, other than her bare 
allegations. 
In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock 
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Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Ut. 1985), this Court reversed the 
trial court's finding of unconscionability in a contract relating 
to oil and gas royalty rights. This Court discussed substantive 
unconscionability and procedural unconscionability. Substantive 
unconscionability examines the fairness of the contractual 
obligations assumed. Ld. at 1041. In the case at bar, there is 
not a scintilla of evidence that the mutual obligations are 
disparate. Plaintiff could have refused to buy the policy in 
question. She has presented no evidence that she was burdened by 
the payments, which she could have cancelled at any time. She 
has not shown oppression or unfair surprise by one-sided contract 
terms. She has shown no overall imbalance of obligations, 
excessive price or significant cost-price disparity. Jd. at 
1041-42. 
Similarly, her record is devoid of evidence of procedural 
unconscionability which examines the parties' positions and the 
manner in which the contract was negotiated. There is a printed 
form regarding the contract. Practicality cannot dictate 
otherwise. However, she has failed to show the contract terms 
are incomprehensible, or divert her attention, or are 
inconspicuous and deceptive. She has failed to show she was 
compelled to accept. Id. at 1047. The endorsement could not be 
made more clear. It is set apart in clear and simple language 
and not hidden within the body of the policy. More importantly, 
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there is no dispute that the Plaintiff had in her possession the 
policy and endorsement in question for at least two years before 
the loss. Plaintiff is attempting to determine unconscionability 
by hindsight, which is not permissible. Id. at 1043. Basically, 
her claim is based on "the fervent hope usually engendered by 
loss." Wagner, supra at 64. 
Point IV 
Plaintiff IS BARRED FROM ARGUING THE ENDORSEMENT IS 
AMBIGUOUS AND SHE NEVER SO CLAIMED IN ANY ASPECT OF 
THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS-
As this Court has stated: 
We have held that matters not raised at the 
tricil court level will not be considered by this 
Court on appeal, particularly, when the problem 
could have been resolved below. 
Mascaro, supra at 944. (citations omitted). This Court will 
decline to address for the first time on appeal an issue not 
raised by the pleadings and not addressed by the trial court. 
Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Ut. 1986). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has never raised the issue 
of ambiguity. It is nowhere to be found in her Complaint, her 
Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment nor 
in any other part of the record. This Court should decline to 
review that issue at this late point. 
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Point V 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO Plaintiff IS ALLOWED TO RAISE THE 
ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY, SHE HAS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE AMBIGUITY; MOREOVER, THE COURTS 
HAVE RULED THAT THE PROVISION IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The exclusionary endorsement set forth is simple and 
clear. Other courts have considered it and upheld it, in the 
face of such attacks. In Suba v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
114 A.D.2d 280, 498 N.Y.Supp.2d 656 (1986), the court reviewed a 
similarly-worded exclusion and held it was not ambiguous. 
Similarly, the California courts have rejected such attacks for 
almost identical policy language. Alstadt, supra. and 
Clendeninq, supra. The New Hampshire court in Sciaudone, supra, 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Merseth, supra, both rejected 
the same contentions for similarly-worded exclusions. 
Without ambiguity, the insured's reasonable expectations 
doctrine does not come into play. Vaughn, supra, and Merseth, 
supra. Therefore, the Court, if it is inclined to consider the 
ambiguity argument, should reject it. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Procedure, there 
is a factual record before the trial court to support its ruling. 
There were no controverted facts. The facts set forth in 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment are deemed admitted for the purposes of summary 
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judgment. If there are any aspects of the record missing, those 
aspects presumptively support the court's ruling. Moreover, the 
majority rule rejects public policy attacks on household 
exclusions in homeowner's policies, because they are not 
mandatory. Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence that 
the insurance contract in question was an adhesion contract and 
that it was either procedurally unconscionable or substantively 
unconscionable. She has the burden to come forward with such 
evidence and did not do so. Since she is raising ambiguity for 
the first time on appeal, she is barred from doing so. Even 
assximing arguendo that she could raise that issue, the very same 
policy language has been considered by a number of courts, all of 
which have found it clear and unambiguous. Therefore, the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <P 7 day of April, 1990. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Ty^ J.' TSAKALOS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant to be mailed by first-
class mail, postage prepaid on this JL 7* day of April, 1990, to 
the following: 
H. Ralph Klemm 
349 South 200 East, Suite 560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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